职教学生的规范教育

本文对职教学生的规范教育状况进行了分析,就当前如何做好职教学生的规范教育提出了设想,并作了述评。     

Disclosure of reserve quantum in the extractive industries

We explore why some firms in the extractive industries disclose mineral reserve quantum in their annual reports and others do not. We propose that the firms' reserve disclosure policies are a function of the extent of information asymmetries, as well as information production, litigation and proprietary costs. More specifically, we propose that a firm's decisions to disclose reserves in the annual report are a function of the stage of the firm's operations, use of project financing, and the cost of measuring reserves. Empirical tests are confirmatory.     

The Productivity of US States since 1880

This study uses state-level variation in labor productivity levels at twenty-year intervals between 1880 and 1980 to examine the relative importance of institutional and geographical influences in explaining observed and persistent differences in standards of living over time and across regions. Focusing on fundamental rather than proximate influences, we find that both institutional characteristics and some physical geography characteristics account for a high proportion of the differences in state productivity levels: states with navigable waterways, a large minerals endowment, and no slaves in 1860, on average, had higher labor productivity levels throughout the sample period. However, we find little support for two other influences that have previously received attention—climate and latitude.     

Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints

We show that all-pay auctions dominate first-price sealed-bid auctions when bidders face budget constraints. This ranking is explained by the fact that budget constraints bind less frequently in the all-pay auctions, which leads to more aggressive bidding in that format.     

The Bank of England quarterly model of the UK economy

The Bank of England first acquired a macroeconomic model of the UK economy in early 1973, and used it for forecasting in June and July of that year. The initial model was obtained from the London Business School (LBS), but the last 14 years or so have, on the part of both the Bank and the LBS, led to developments which now make the models no closer to each other than to other large scale models of the UK. This article describes the structure and central properties of the current version of the Bank model, which has some 663 variables, 134 of which are modelled by behavioural equations, 153 by technical equations, 212 identities and 164 exogenous variables. In order to provide a transitional step between the kind of models with which most macroeconomists are familiar and the full scale version of the Bank model, one part of the article presents a very simple stylized version of the full model. This is a stepping stone to the full model which is described and analysed on a sectoral basis in Part 3, with a complete listing of equations in Part 4. Some of the simulation properties, and hence full model dynamic responses, are considered in Part 5.     

The dynamics of some duopoly games involving the Market Share and Nichol strategies

The paper analyses the dynamics of some duopoly output games involving the Cournot, Market-Share and Nichol strategies. The model assumes linear price and cost functions and supposes that outputs are adjusted instantaneously at discrete time intervals. For all games considered, equilibrium is either reached after a finite number of moves or a stable approach to equilibrium occurs as t → ∞. In fact, apart from a few uninteresting cases, arising from the oversimplified form of the Market-Share strategy, all equilibrium points lie on specified parts of the firms' Cournot loci.     

Economic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects

Summary. We construct an OLG model with network effects to examine skill obsolescence when individuals can choose technological vintages. In the absence of transfer payments, some regions of the parameter space have unique stationary equilibria, others have unique cyclical equilibria, and others have multiple stationary equilibria. All equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, rat race equilibria can exist in which all agents currently alive prefer a slower rate of progress than occurs in equilibrium. When contemporaneous transfers are allowed, equilibria are unique everywhere, but a cycle still exists, and a rat race can still arise in equilibrium. Allowing intertemporal transfers (debt) ensures that all equilibria are stationary. In the relevant parameter range, the introduction of debt can eliminate cycles and increase the long-run growth rate. No rat race equilibria exist when debt is allowed.Received: 3 January 2002, Revised: 3 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: 041, J24, O33. Correspondence to: Ian P. KingEarly versions of this paper were presented at the West Coast Macro Workshop, the Mid-West Macro Meetings, the Canadian Macroeconomics Study Group Meetings, and the Society for Economic Dynamics Meetings. We would like to thank V. V. Chari, Merwan Engineer, Don Ferguson, John Hillas, John Knowles, Dan Peled, Dan Usher, Linda Welling and Julian Wright for helpful comments. We are especially grateful to an anonymous referee for some very useful and substantive comments.     

The decentralisation of employment relations in the British public sector

The aim of this article is to investigate differences between the British public and private sectors in terms of the decentralisation of employment relations. Drawing on data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, the article arrives at three main conclusions. First, the analysis reveals that while local‐level managers in both sectors have similar levels of responsibility for employment relations issues, those in the public sector are, on the whole, significantly less likely to be able to exercise authority. Second, the results indicate some marked variations in practice within the public sector, with managers in education having the greatest level of authority. Finally, the article explores the extent to which differences in local‐level authority between the public and private sectors can be explained by higher‐level collective bargaining, and the presence of higher‐level personnel specialists. These factors have only a partial influence, and do not fully explain why local‐level employee relations managers in some areas (notably health) are less able to exercise authority than their counterparts in the private sector.